complexity

Complexity and Reductionism
By: Doug McManaman

Can matter organize itself to form complex structures? Why is it said that this would violate the principle of non-contradiction? The complex structure doesn't exist yet, and the organization is of the matter and not the structure itself. As Kaufman argues, there is an intrinsic property in atoms and molecules that accounts for the spontaneous self-ordering we observe in nature.

Change is the fulfillment of what exists potentially insofar as it exists potentially. The movement towards more complex organization is a movement from potency to act. It is the fulfillment of a potentiality. Now, can living things emerge from non-living things? Can non-living matter organize itself into highly complex living matter? Not without denying the essential difference between living and non-living things, which is what some people have done and continue to do so.

Kaufman argues that complexity results from a self-organizing character which is an intrinsic property of atoms and molecules (See Stuart Kaufman, At Home in the Universe (Oxford University Press, 1995)

Despite the fact that there is no experimental basis for such an "intrinsic property", we will examine this notion from the point of view of the Philosophy of Nature. This should be enough to show why there is no experimental basis for such a property; for the idea of such an intrinsic property is a mere fiction. I believe that part of the problem here lies in a vague understanding of what is meant by property, not to mention matter.

Now Kaufman speaks of matter having an inherent property, a property towards self-organization (which is the same thing as self-realization). But matter is an analogous term. Matter is a potentiality. First or ultimate matter is pure potentiality or pure "indeterminacy". Secondary matter is an existing nature. The elements, for instance, are existing natures. They are matter insofar as they are potential principles, that is, insofar as they are open to further determination. But they are "not-matter" insofar as they are determined; that is, insofar as they are something actual or definite (form, in other words). An element is not pure potentiality. Beryllium, for instance, is an existing nature. It is more than pure matter. It can be an object of science. We can know its nature, for it is intelligible. And so it is a composite of matter and form, or potency and act. As an existing nature it has properties which the chemist knows about, and in knowing its properties, he comes to know its nature; for properties flow necessarily, always, and universally from a determinate nature.

Does Kaufman mean by matter that which Aristotle calls secondary matter? Very likely. I think it is safe to say that matter in Kaufman is equivalent to the elements. If not, our work becomes much easier.

The claim is that matter can self-organize into more complex systems. But what exactly does that mean? Does it mean that matter can give to itself what it previously did not have? The answer is either yes, it can, in which case we get something from nothing. Or the answer is no, it need not, because it already has it, in which case all matter is living, sentient, and rational; or no, because there is no newly acquired perfection, in which case there is no essential difference between living and non-living things.

Man, for instance, has abilities that a horse does not have. Man has the ability to laugh and to learn grammar. These are properties rooted in the nature of man, that is, in his nature as a rational animal. The horse or the mouse does not have these properties, for a mouse is a different kind of thing than a human being. Mice are not rational. They do not have a rational nature. Man, consequently, has more power or more potentiality than a horse or a mouse, and therefore more act by virtue of the realization of that potentiality (for potentiality has reference to act). Man has more being (act) than a horse. Man is a higher being. The horse, moreover, is a higher being than an oak tree (higher in the qualitative sense, not in the quantitative sense). The power of sense knowledge and locomotion are properties of the animal. The animal has more power, which is why an animal is more than a plant.

The plant, on the other hand, has properties that non-living matter does not have. The elements do not have the power of growth and nutrition, for example. Plants have more being than minerals; for they have more power, which is potentiality, and the realization of that potentiality is a greater realization than the realization we see on the mineral level. They have more because they are more.

Now, can the elements give themselves these properties? Firstly, each element has its own properties which flow necessarily from its nature. Some elements are less stable than others are, for instance, have a different melting point, react with certain others under certain conditions, etc. It is the science of chemistry that studies these properties. These properties are not those of living things; for chemistry is not biology. An element is a different nature than a worm with entirely different properties. The elements are potentially living, not actually living. The elements as such do not have the properties that are proper to living things. But they are potentially living, and so they are capable of acquiring these properties. But they do not actually have them. To have them actually requires that they be something essentially different. For property flows necessarily from the nature or essence of a thing. But in order for the elements to be something essentially different or to become something more (with more power) requires that they be moved to be such by something already actually such. In other words, nothing reduces itself from potentiality to actuality except by something already in act.

To have the property to self-organize into a certain kind of being presupposes that it is already that kind of thing. The conceptus, for example, displays self-organization. The conceptus transforms and orders what it receives from its mother. It transforms non-living matter into living matter and organizes it into parts of itself. It has this property because it is essentially a living being already; for it is property that inheres in an essence, and an essence implies its properties.

As was said above, nothing moves itself from potency to act. If something is in potentiality with regard to some perfection or other, then it does not actually have that perfection. If I am potentially virtuous, then I am not actually virtuous. What is already in act imparts act upon what is in potentiality towards receiving it, i.e., what is already moving imparts motion upon what is potentially moving (Cf. Nothing moves itself in a primary way).

Matter is not living. In itself it does not have life (which is an act), and so it cannot impart life to itself--otherwise we would get something from nothing, that is, an effect not contained in the cause and thus not explained or accounted for by the cause. We would have an effect without a "why?" (Cf. Creation from Nothing)

The only way around this is to maintain that a living thing is not essentially different from non-living things, and that living sentient creatures are not essentially different from vegetative life, and finally that human life is not essentially different from that of mere brute animals. These others are simply more complex. But the reason why man has properties that brutes do not have is that man is essentially different from brute. He has more being, or more act, that is, he is capable of more being (his potencies to further activity are real existing powers or abilities). Essence is the root of a thing's properties. So, if it is the essence of matter to become living, sentient and finally rational, then matter is essentially living, sentient and rational. The hierarchy of being is thereby flattened.

And yet there is hierarchy. Some beings can relate to others without losing their identity. The more a being is capable of this, the higher up it is on the scale of the hierarchy of being. Oxygen cannot relate to hydrogen without losing its identity, for instance, while other elements can maintain their identity. A plant can relate to some matter without losing its identity, while the matter will lose its identity in this relationship, most notably in nutrition. An animal knows something outside of itself. This is a relationship with things that is far richer and far more profound than any relationship a plant is capable of. And the animal, in knowing something outside of itself, does not lose its identity nor does it cause the thing seen (acted upon) to lose its identity. But an intense brightness or a very loud sound can alter the animal to some degree (the organ of sensation). It can alter his ability to perceive further. And finally, man can actually become what he knows in an immaterial way. He can grasp the being and nature of a thing, i.e., the nature of matter, of number, of living things, etc., without altering his identity or the identity of the thing he knows. Because intellection is entirely immaterial, it is not possible that the intensity of the object of knowledge damage his ability to know.

Now, let us return to the example of the conceptus for a moment. The conceptus does indeed organize itself. But that is because it is what it becomes. Formal and final causality coincide. The conceptus gives to non-living matter what it has or what it is, namely life or a living thing. The conceptus has form, and it receives matter from its mother and transforms it (changes its form into its own form). It organizes that matter. Why? Because it is an organism. It is organized, not disorganized. The organizing principle is not matter (it is matter that receives organization), but form. Form organizes or forms foreign matter into a unity because the conceptus is already a unity. There is a unifying principle. The form is that unifying principle (that principle of actuality).

An army without a unifying principle is scattered, disorganized. The soldiers are the matter, so to speak, capable of being organized or unified. The General's plan of action is the organizing principle, or unifying principle. Each individual soldier has to have the one end in view (intend the one end) if the whole army is to act for that one end, as an organism so to speak, that is, an organized unity. But this can only happen if each receives the one unified plan from the one source. Without that plan, each soldier goes his own way, and you end up with disorganization, or disorder. We have to ask: what is the cause or principle of this self-organization? Clearly not the potentiality for unity, but the principles of actual unity, in this case the General.

When you have self-organization, obviously you have a self. Self means that there is one thing. One thing organizes itself. But if you have a raw multiplicity, then you cannot have self-organization, because there is no "self", or unified entity. So if there is self-organization, then there is a unity already. Matter is not a principle of unity, because matter (at least secondary matter) is a multitude that is capable and open to unity (prime matter does not contain within its meaning the idea of unity. It is merely potentiality or indeterminacy). It is the subject of unity.

But if there is no self-organization, but rather organization that results in a unity, then we have another problem. How do we explain this convergence towards a certain goal (one goal)? How do we explain this dynamic finality? This unified intention or movement? Now this intention towards one goal, in our example of the army, is an intention that is conscious. There is awareness of this one intention (the overall plan). But with regard to things that have no ability to know, that is, no conscious awareness of their own movement, we may still speak of intention towards one goal. A pianist, for instance, is not necessarily aware of each movement of one's fingers when playing the piano. After a lot of practice, playing the piece becomes "second nature". The fingers are moving "naturally", that is, with intention or purpose, even though the pianist is not consciously deliberating on each note.

To say that there is dynamic finality, that is, unified direction or intended direction is simply another way of saying that this movement is not accidental, in the sense of chance. Chance implies at least two causal series acting for an end (each intending its own end), and there is an intersection of two causal series, and this intersection was accidental (unintended) i.e., two people bumping into each other who have not seen each other in years. In short, in order for chance to be understood, one needs final causality as the necessary background of the chance event.

The claim of self-organization implies that all the various elements or units are intending ultimately (not necessarily proximately) the same thing. Hence there is final causality. There is a single ultimate term towards which the multiplicity moves. There is a final causality that is ultimately one. In other words, there is unity. This means that there is form (form is unity). A self-organizing system has form. Without form, you have no unity. If you say that the multiplicity unifies itself, that is, intends the one end without there being a unifying source or principle (a formal principle), then you have to explain how the multiplicity has this one intention. If not purposefully, that is, by its very nature, then by accident? This is all we are left with. In other words, its principle is nothing. You are getting something from nothing. You are getting finality from non-finality, or intention from the unintended.

If you say it gets its unified intention from each one, that does not answer the question. Each one of the multiplicity has the same thing, the same intention, the same movement, the same tendency or inclination, the same goal. It does not have the unity by virtue of the multiplicity, but by virtue of a unity, which is other than the multiplicity. Multiplicity is rooted in unity, that is, you cannot have multiplicity without unity, for instance a number of seconds without the unit of a "second", or 50 litres without the unit of a litre. Unit is the principle of number. So unity is prior to multiplicity. But the unity we refer to here is the unity that the multiplicity is open to or capable of. Unity is the principle of multiplicity. Multiplicity is not itself a unity, but is subject to unity or potentially determined to unity.

So, back to our original question: What is the principle of this one intention or unity? If there is no principle, then you cannot explain how or why it is acting towards this unity. In this case it would mean that the multiplicity has something that is not contained in the meaning of multiplicity, namely unity. There is no cause of that unity. In other words, we are getting something from nothing. A unity from what is not a unity, but a multiplicity, that is, a self-organization without a self. An organization without an organizing principle. Intention without intention. And this is absurd. In short, it is a violation of non-contradiction (Nothing can be and not be at the same time and in the same respect. In this case, something is potential and actual at the same time and in the same respect. Something has a certain perfection, and yet it does not have this perfection because it must acquire it, and both states of affairs exist simultaneously and in the same respect). But what acts with intention does not act by chance or by accident.

So the good thing about complexity is that the world of science is finally getting out of its reductionstic mechanism. But we are creatures of habit, and some scientists want to keep their reductionistic habitus in the new company of complexity. Complexity continues to maintain that the complex is not explained by the less complex (as in mechanism). This means that the less complex comes from the whole, which has more than the less complex. It has more, not less. The whole is more than the mere sum of its parts. The whole has that unifying principle, which in Aristotelian terminology is the substantial form (the substance is the composite of matter and form), or "organism" in the terminology of Whitehead. The more does not result from the less, which is another way of saying that the effect cannot be greater than the cause.

Kaufman's reductionism is rooted in the logical fallacy of part and whole. In this case it consists in attributing to a part what belongs only to a whole. One may insist that he does no such thing and that he takes complexity seriously. But reductionism cannot be reconciled with complexity. If the potential can reduce itself to the actual, this is in effect what one ends up with, namely the fallacy of part and whole (the fallacy of reductionism)--unless of course he admits that something can come from nothing, which in that case he'd be more than illogical, but irrational. The only difference between his reductionism and the old reductionism is that the old reductionism was more honest.