What do we mean by energy? Power. Work. Force. Tension. Movement. Potential energy is energy "poised and ready for action". Traditionally, energy has been defined as the power to do work.
Now, energy, in so far as it can be measured, can be made an object of empiriological physics. But the "what" of energy (what is it?) is not, strictly speaking, a scientific question. In fact, "we have no knowledge of what energy is", says physicist Richard Feynman. If we are referring to the ultimate nature of energy, we are dealing with something that is prior to measurement.
In the Aristotelian perspective, energy is not some sort of entity, nor is it a kind of substrate that underlies things. The Greek word for act, as in the first act of a material substance, is energy. Aristotle uses the word "energeia" as the act of matter:
"...about the substrate, of which we have said that it underlies in two senses, either being a `this,' which is the way an animal underlies its affections,-or as the matter underlies the act (energeia)"[1]
So, the substantial "energy" of a substance is its substantial act. But just as "act" is the realisation of a potency, so we must not consider energy as some sort of distinct entity, much less should we attempt to picture it, nor must we conceive it as something measurable. Quantities alone are measurable. But the substantial act (energeia) is the act of a potentiality (namely matter). First matter does not have the ability to do work, for what is pure potentiality is not actually anything. But, as realised by form or act, prime matter can then be said to have energy, for it has form or act. Potency and act are distinct, but not separate. The substantial energy of a thing is its essential intelligibility; it makes the thing to be what it is.
A substance has powers or potencies, and these are potencies to further acts, or activity. But these are actual potencies, and so they are powers of the form, powers of the "primordial energy" or substantial act. The entity, as a composite of potency and act, has the ability to do certain kinds of work. The kinds of things it will be able to do will depend on the kind of thing it is (second act follows upon first act).
So, energy does not simply take forms. Energy is form, or the act of matter. It is matter as potentiality that takes form. There are varying degrees of energy in that there are various forms, some of which are more powerful than others. Man has more power than plant, for example.
But this explanation only goes so far philosophically. We have yet to explain the "why" of these varying degrees of power. We can do this only by once again reverting to another level. And this takes us to our next problem, for it is said: Energy can neither be created nor destroyed.
This is true. To create, in the true sense of that word, is to bring something into being ex nihilo (from nothing). It is not possible for us to impart being. At the most we can beget our likeness, that is, beings of the same nature. We do not, nonetheless, impart existence on a nature like our own. It is not our nature "to be". We have being, but we are human. If I am my own being, then I could impart existence; for like begets like. But my actions are limited by the very limits of my nature. So, I cannot create nor destroy energy, nor can I create or destroy anything. If I cannot impart being, I cannot withdraw being from an existing nature. I can destroy a thing, that is, transform it, but I cannot annihilate. For that is to act existentially, which is impossible.[2]
But energy does not have within
itself
the explanation for its own existence; for the act of anything does not
include within itself its existence. Being is outside the
essence
of a thing. So existence is also an act; the act of all acts. We could
say that the act of existence is an "existential energy". Nonetheless,
we should avoid using the word energy for act; for the word 'energy' is
so wedded to the framework of empiriological physics that using it in a
philosophical context can only generate confusion.
Notes
1Metaph., Z 13,1038b5-6.
2See
Joseph Owens. An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Houston: Center for
Thomistic Studies, 1986), 132ff.
Copyright © 1998 by
Douglas
P. McManaman
All Rights Reserved