The second law of thermodynamics deals with the instability of nature. All the original energy of the universe will not be destroyed; rather it will have become unavailable for useful work. The universe will at some point run out of the energy it needs for all forms of motion and activity. A heat death is in store for the universe. Matter and energy will have reached a state of inertness and quiescence.

Smith points out that hylomorphism is necessary to account for the facts of thermodynamics. No matter what imperceptible changes may take place in things like iron door knobs or pine trees, they remain what they were long before a prospector might have found the mine from which the iron came, for instance, or before the scientist (who measures the changes in the tree) was ever born.[1]

The atom is far more conservative than the electron. The being of an electron is so inert, so potential (not pure potentiality) that it can only individuate not much more than a few accidents at a time. In combination the electron loses its nature and is virtually present in its new substantial context. But the atom is far less inert than the electron or other elementary particles. It is more stable and conservative, and it is far more capable of acting without destroying its whole nature in the action. It can hold its own when combined, i.e., in bronze (copper, zinc, etc.). The electron, on the other hand, obtains its vibrating frequency not on its own, but from its atomic context. The atom, in short, has more being, more act, and is less inert than the electron and the other elementary particles. The atom is stable, but its components are not stable. Moreover, the atom's stability does not come from the instability of its components. Greater stability is not obtained by adding lesser stabilities. More act is not obtained by a juxtaposition of potencies. More and more inertia does not give us less inertia.[2]

The universe is indeed running downhill, but it is not doing so at a violent pace, with infinite velocity. There are conservative principles at work here. There are "braking principles in the process." If not, there is no reason, argues Smith, why this downhill drive should not attain infinite speed and wipe out all distinction and determination. The multiplicity of determination (determinate natures) is an index of a multiplicity of such resistive principles - determinate natures.

¹ V.E. Smith, Philosophical Physics (New York:. Harper & Brothers, 1950), 212.

² Ibid., 214-15.

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