They are identified as different substances by the number of protons they contain. That is the only measurable way we can identify them as different. Carbon contains six protons and hydrogen only one. But it is concluded: "Therefore the number of protons determines what kind of element we will have." But this does not follow. Because differences in kind are accompanied by differences in quantity (number of protons), it does not follow that the quantity (this different number) is that which determines the elements to be different in kind. "Kind" (Genos) is a qualitative term, and not a quantitative term. Only quantity as such is measurable, not "kind", that is, the nature (physis) of the thing. We come to know what (not how much: quantity) an element is by its activity. Knowing how many protons it has does not tell us what it is. Nor does the number determine what a thing is any more than your weight determines what you are. Quantity and quality are two irreducibly different modes of being. Let me explain.
What is determinate is definite (de-terminate; finished; finite). What is definite can be defined (for it is de-finite). To define something is to express its essence. What is definable has an essence, that is, an essential quality, an intelligible structure. In short, it is knowable. It is an object of science. Now there is no science of particulars. Science is of universals. What the chemist knows of Carbon is the nature of carbon. He understands what it is, which is not a "how much", although that is part of his knowledge - and certainly "how much" in terms of the subatomic particles is part of the physicist's knowledge, since this seems to be the only measurable criterion for distinguishing one element from another. The chemist understands how Carbon acts or how it reacts. What he knows is what kind of thing it is. Quantity does not determine or define a thing. A quantity is always a quantity of a particular kind of thing, i.e. 6 protons, 1 elephant with 4 legs. Consider the following: if the number of protons determines what the element is, then what determines the proton to be what it is? Number of quarks? What determines quarks to be what they are? Number of some other subatomic particle? Mesons? Ultimately we are really not explaining anything here. For what makes these subatomic particles to be what they are? Smaller subatomic particles? We get ourselves into an infinite regress in matter when quantity becomes the criterion for nature. And more importantly, this would mean that the atom is not anything determinate: for it has no essential quality or nature. It is nothing in-itself. But the proton as well would not be anything determinate, nothing in-itself, for it is what it is by virtue of something outside of itself (since there is no "itself"), namely the quarks. But a quark is also nothing determinate, nothing in-itself, that is, not a determinate nature. And a regress in one direction will mean that everything is indeterminate. Nothing exists in-itself.
From another angle, it would seem that every atom of every element should all be of the same kind, only of different quantities (for quantity gives us more or less of the same thing). Carbon should be the same kind of thing as hydrogen, just more of the same, or vice versa.[1]
And quantity is not an efficient, formal, or final cause. How does it become a formal cause on the subatomic level? And how does one explain the leap from pure quantity to quality?[2]
Matter is an analogous term. The only matter that investigative science can measure and investigate is that which has mass and extension. But this is not ultimate matter. Note the language here: "has mass and extension". What is it that has mass and extension? Clearly mass and extension are not primary. They are quantitative terms, and quantity is an accident of a material substance (quantity "inheres in"; ac-cidere). Pure quantity would be unintelligible. Quantity has a subject, and this is the substance itself. And substance is always of a determinate nature; otherwise it would be indeterminate, indefinite, unintelligible, and unknowable. The atom of Democritus was thought to be a pure quantity, and this seems to be the case with our original question.
But even a mathematical entity such as a triangle or rectangle is not a pure quantity. The matter of the triangle is not made of wood or steel, the matter of the triangle is an intelligible matter.[3] The triangle has a subject, and this subject is intelligible matter, as opposed to sensible matter (wood, steel). We could not have a triangle without a subject any more than we could have a color without a subject. And yet in the real world, there is more than geometry. There are definite kinds of things that have shape and size and sensible qualities. Mathematics abstracts from these. And so it is no coincidence that mechanistic atomism developed originally as a direct result of the influence of a mathematician/philosopher (Pythagoras), and was resurrected again in the modern world as the direct result of the influence of a mathematician/philosopher (Descartes).[4]
What determines Carbon to be Carbon is not something that the investigative sciences can measure. For what is prior to quantity escapes measurement. One cannot investigate, measure, or picture the formal cause of Carbon or Hydrogen; rather, one has to think it.
And for the ending of the above
formulated
problem: "In the case of a human being, missing specific parts makes it
to be something other than what it was," is certainly true because some
parts are essential to the human organism. Take away the heart and you
have a different kind of substance. In fact, you no longer have one
substance,
but a multiplicity of non-living substances. But quantity as such only
extends the substance. The rich content of those parts is not
determined
by quantity. Their content is determined by the nature of the thing.
And
so a human being has a human heart, which is a specific kind of
part (note the word "specific", from species). Species is a qualitative
term, not quantitative. The human species is a universal, not a
particular.
In fact, as Plato said long ago, particulars (such as parts or
"particles")
do not determine "kind" (genos), or nature (physis), or form (eidos).
For
these latter are universal in character, unlimited and immaterial.
Notes
1Aristotle. Metaph., D . 13, 1020a6-30; Cat., 6,4b20-6a35.
2See F. F. Centore, Persons, 69ff.
3Metaph., Z 10,1036a1-12; Z 11,1036b32-1037a5.
4See Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Scribner's, 1937) 125-151.
Copyright © 1998 by
Douglas
P. McManaman
All Rights Reserved