Spinoza and the Unity of Reality

Spinoza and the Unity of Reality
By: Doug McManaman

In his Ethics, Spinoza begins his entire philosophy with the concept or idea of being.

He writes: "By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing"[1] (emphasis mine).

Now, for Descartes, substance is of two kinds: spiritual (whose primary attribute is thinking), and corporeal (whose primary attribute is extension).

The next "Definition" in the Ethics runs: "That thing is called finite in its own kind (in suo genere) which can be limited by another thing of the same nature. For example, a body is called finite because we always conceive another which is greater. So a thought is limited by another thought; but a body is not limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body."[2]

Note the use of the term "conceived". Under the influence of Descartes, Spinoza begins with the idea, that is, he begins in the mind in order to determine the nature of what is real.

Next, Spinoza writes: "By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in other words, that the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed."[3]

Now at this point, we should recall the principle that Descartes established in his Meditations:

...all the things which we apprehend clearly and distinctly belong to the realm of possibility. Ie, they can be created by God, even if we do not yet know whether they have been so created....Therefore, it is sufficient that I should be able to apprehend one thing clearly and distinctly apart from another to be assured that the two are really different and that the one can be created without the other.[4]

So Spinoza is in his mind, and the idea of substance is the simplest of ideas in that it does not require any other concept in order to be understood or formed. And if he can conceive of it by itself, that is, with the help of no other concept, then it exists by itself and in itself, and does not require anything other than itself to be. This, recall, was Descartes' notion of substance: "An existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist". And Descartes argued that only God fits this description, and so only God is substance primarily. Spinoza will capitalize on this idea.

Now, let's return to the first line of the Ethics: "By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing". A being whose essence involves existence is a being who is "Being Itself." Now Spinoza argues that substance is that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in other words, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which it must be formed. Hence, substance is being.

And just as Substance is the simplest of ideas in that it requires nothing but itself in order to be conceived, so too is Being the simplest and clearest of ideas that requires nothing but itself in order to be understood.

For the sake of clarity we will stay with the term "being" instead of "substance". In this way we will more readily why according to Spinoza there can only be one Being. We have seen that he, in line with Descartes, identifies logical being with real being. He begins with the idea of being. As an idea, being is the simplest and clearest of ideas, and it is true that the idea of being is the ground of intelligibility. Unless I understand being, I cannot understand anything else; for I first have to understand that something is before I can come to understand "what it is". Now being or substance can only be one. For the idea of Being excludes multiplicity, as Parmenides makes clear. As an idea, how can Being be two? What would distinguish them? Something they don't have in common? But all they are is Being, and outside of Being is non-being. Therefore nothing outside of Being would distinguish them, so they would be one, not two.

If the idea of Being excludes multiplicity, then for Spinoza Being is really One, and not multiple. And since Being and Substance are the same thing, there is only one Substance in reality.

Not only is Being (Substance) One, according to Spinoza, but it is infinite, since there is nothing outside of Being to limit it. So Being or Substance is infinite in all lines of being. But even though it is infinite in all lines of being, substance is only known under two attributes: thought and extension. Being or Substance is both extended and thinking.

Now, according to these principles, you and I are not substances, because Substance is One. We are only finite modes of the One Substance. This is called Pantheism (God and the Universe are One), which is why some have referred to Spinoza the father of modern Pantheism.

So what is this One Substance? Descartes said it, "only God fits the description of substance." According to Spinoza, Being is Substance, and Substance is God. The Universe is God's infinite mode, and the particular things that make up the Universe (ourselves included) are God's finite modes.

God is not only One and infinite, but God is indivisible and simple. This must be the case because division produces multiplicity, and Being as the simplest of ideas excludes multiplicity.

God is incorporeal yet corporeal. His finite modes are corporeal (bodily). But the infinite cannot degrade itself into the finite, or into a finite mode. And so God is incorporeal, yet corporeal.

And God is thought whose finite modes are particular human spirits. So for Spinoza, God is not and cannot be a human for the same reason as above: Infinite Substance cannot degrade itself into one a finite mode. And so a true Spinozian would have to reject Christianity insofar as Christians profess that God the Son joined Himself to a human nature and became man.

Now God is infinite in action. His activity though is not transitive but immanent. In other words, God does not cause things to happen outside of Itself because God is Being, and there is nothing outside of Being. So God is not a transitive cause. This is why Spinoza rejected his Jewish heritage. For the Hebrew Scriptures reveal a God who is a transitive cause; for He created the Universe from nothing, and all that is created is really distinct from God. But not for Spinoza.

God is supremely free in "his" action since he is not coerced; for there is nothing outside of Being. There is no other substance to coerce God to act. Yet, the finite modes proceed necessarily from God. "Creation" is therefore necessary - free and not free at the same time. Just as the mathematical properties of a triangle proceed from it in a necessary, eternal and infallible way, so too does all activity within the Universe proceed necessarily and infallibly from the One Substance.

But the universe is not one substance, but a multiplicity of substances. When being is treated as a genus, the inevitable result is a monism. Being is not an idea, that is, not a universal. Essences can have a universal mode of existing in the intellect, and certainly being can be treated as an idea, which is precisely what Parmenides, Spinoza and Hegel in fact did. But being is not the poorest, the emptiest of concepts, which is what happens to being when treated as a concept. Being, rather, is the richest content of our knowing, and it is apprehended in the second act of the intellect, which is judgment, not the first act of the intellect (simple apprehension). Being is not pure potentiality, which is what it would amount to if it were a universal idea. Rather, it is the act of the potentiality which is an essence. It is the act of all the acts of a thing; for it is the perfection of all perfections. God, who is Being Itself, does not have His act of existing in common with other beings. He is His own unique act of existing, just as you have your own unique act of existing that has nothing in common with mine.

Notes

¹Benedict de Spinoza. Ethics, I, Def. I.

²Ibid., I, Def. II.

³Ibid., I, Def. III.

⁴Descartes. The Philosophical Works of Descartes. Tr. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 158. It is at this point that Descartes identifies logical being with real being, and it is this principle that accounts for his resurrection of dualism.